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Abstract 
Irregular migration in recent years has thrown Europe off-balance, with the rise in 
Euroscepticism indicating the conflict between national sovereignty and the need to 
find international solutions to transboundary challenges. Rather than focusing on neo-
functional spillover occurring internally, this paper focuses on exogenous factors that 
trigger integration in the European Union (EU). The analysis addresses the following 
research question: What has been the effect of the 2011 Arab Spring and the 2015 
‘refugee crisis’ on the institutionalisation of EU border management? It is argued that 
the EU has externalised integrated border management to neighbouring countries or 
regions to fulfil its internal border management objectives. Libya and Turkey are used 
as case studies both due to their relevance to the EU as neighbouring transit countries 
for migrants and because of their differing domestic situations and relations with 
Europe. While Libya has moved closer to re-establishing a centralised government and 
Turkey has established a new Directorate-General for Migration Management in its 
Ministry of Interior, the EU itself has also transformed since the onset of the refugee crisis. 
This study explores examples such as the widened mandate of FRONTEX and the 
negotiation of the ‘EU-Turkey deal’ to demonstrate how the EU has adapted to 
external developments. Libya and Turkey will also be contrasted in terms of the 
progress that has been achieved at an EU level. Therefore, this study does not see third 
countries merely as passive recipients of EU foreign policy but also as agents in and of 
themselves, influencing EU institutions from the ‘outside-in’. 
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Introduction: The Externalisation of Internal Policy 
The Middle East policy of the European Union (EU) underwent drastic modifications 
since the onset of the Arab uprisings. Although managing migratory flows beyond 
European soil is by no means a new approach, EU initiatives seem to be headed more 
intently in this direction in recent years. In attempting to stem the flow of migration 
along the migratory route, the EU has in a sense fashioned third countries into Europe’s 
new borders. In turn, this creates a heavy reliance on developments from these non-
EU countries and their political will to cooperate with the EU. Even though the 1.5 million 
irregular migrants entering the EU in 2015 correspond to only 0.3% of EU inhabitants, the 
Schengen area has been placed at risk as member states shut their borders and the 
EU struggles to implement a cohesive response. The Area of Freedom Security and 
Justice (AFSJ) remains a shared competence according to Article 4 TFEU, leaving room 
for incoherence, and it has placed the need for asylum reform in the spotlight. 
Moreover, a perceived lack of solidarity from other member states has pushed 
countries to resort to ad hoc bilateral arrangements.1  
Traditional integration theories tend to prioritise internal integration processes rather 
than what triggers them. More attention is given to endogenous factors and causes, 
and research often portrays structural foreign policy as an action which the EU 
enforces on non-EU countries.2 The aim of this paper is to look at the other side of the 
coin, analysing the structural influence that irregular migration from third countries has 
had on European integration, particularly with regards to its border management 
policy in Libya and Turkey. Hence, migration will be seen as an external trigger based 
on two catalytic events: the 2011 Arab Spring which resulted in the ousting of Gaddafi 
and the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ following the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. This may be 
simplified into a single research question: What has been the effect of the 2011 Arab 
Spring and the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ on the institutionalisation of EU border 
management? 
Libya and Turkey have been chosen for their strategic importance to the EU as buffer 
states, but also serve the purpose of portraying drastically different domestic situations 
which influence the nature of their bilateral relations with the EU. Therefore, the political 
                                                          
1 I. Iliev et al., ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: A New Attitude towards the “Southern 
Neighbours”’, in K. Panayotova (ed.), Arab Spring: Hopes for Change and Challenges to the 
EU Foreign and Security Policy, Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012.  
2 S. Keukeleire & T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2nd edn., 2014, pp. 27-29.  
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conditions in Libya and Turkey are pivotal factors. Third countries are not merely 
recipients of EU conditionality but also exert their own conditionality on the EU. This 
raises the question of whether or not each third country’s varying conditions influence 
the deepening of EU integration. The influence of the refugee crisis on the EU’s external 
competences in border management depicts the struggle of member states that must 
choose between retaining sovereignty and uniting for a common response. This paper 
hypothesises that EU competence has increased as a result of efforts to react to 
external factors, suggesting a causal link between external pressures and internal 
developments - in this case the EU’s capacity not only to manage its own external 
borders but also to expand border management beyond the Schengen area. The 
paper concludes that although there has generally been substantial progress when it 
comes to institutionalised integrated border management (IBM), this institutionalisation 
differs in strength when IBM is externalised to Libya and Turkey. It follows that Turkey’s 
bargaining position and Libya’s lack of functioning institutions influence the course of 
EU integration. 
The paper first lays out the methodology used through an analytical framework that 
aims to assess the level of institutionalisation of externalised border management. A 
general overview of border management competences follows, setting the context 
and comparing progress both before the Arab Spring and after. The analytical 
framework is then applied to Libya and Turkey, mainly after 2011, in order to focus on 
the external dimension. This analysis assesses institutionalisation as weak, moderate or 
strong in order to conclude whether the initial hypothesis has been confirmed. The 
conclusions also generates a set of proposals and real-life examples to facilitate the 
institutionalisation process.  
Analytical Framework  
This section will introduce the tools to be used to analyse how EU border security has 
developed since the onset of the Arab Spring and the 2015 migrant and refugee crisis. 
The hypothesis established in the previous section is based on the notion that external 
factors are affecting the EU internally. An effort must therefore be made to maintain 
an ‘outside-in’ perspective by depicting third countries as more than just passive 
subjects of the EU’s policy.3  
                                                          
3 S. Keukeleire & S. Lecocq, “From a Decentring Agenda to a Decentred Analytical Praxis: 
Analysing European Foreign Policy in a Non-European and Post-Western Order”, 8th Pan-
European Conference of the ECPR/EUSG, Trente, 2016. 
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The main concept in this research, institutionalisation, is based on Boin, Ekengren and 
Rhinard’s definition as “the process by which a norm, a law, a practice, or an 
organizational structure takes on institutional characteristics” and by which “processes 
and structures emerge, become embedded in supranational rules, procedures and 
patterns of interaction, and gain legitimacy”.4 They argue that institutionalisation may 
be seen as a spectrum which ranges from intergovernmentalism to fully 
institutionalised modes resembling federalism, placing the EU somewhere in the middle 
range. Similarly, the degree of integration can be measured by considering 
coherence and supranational competences or bodies. Integration may also refer to 
widening through EU accession or policy alignment with third countries (as is the case 
for Turkey). This still leaves the question how institutionalisation can be measured. 
Since migration, asylum and border management are not exclusive EU competences, 
coherence composes one of the main pillars of EU ‘actorness’ in border security. The 
term ‘actorness’ pertains to the EU’s capacity for independent decision-making and 
the strength of its presence in world affairs. It was defined by Sjöstedt as “the capacity 
to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international 
system”.5 In their analysis of the EU as a security actor, Carrapico and Barrinha propose 
an analytical framework for assessing EU coherence in the security sector, drawing a 
correlation between increased coherence and strengthened actorness.6 Carrapico 
and Barrinha’s analysis is split along two types of institutional coherence: horizontal 
relations across EU and national institutions, and vertical relations between EU and 
member state institutions. Institutional coordination is here defined as “the optimal 
alignment of procedures, policy outputs, instruments and actors” needed to address 
transboundary threats.7 Hence, policy coherence or mainstreaming is brought under 
the umbrella of the horizontal dimension along with coordination between institutions, 
bodies and instruments.8 The link between inter- or intra-institutional coherence and 
policy coherence cannot be over-emphasised. It is impossible, for instance, to close 
the gap between internal and external policies without institutional cooperation. 
                                                          
4 A. Boin, M. Ekengren & M. Rhinard, The European Union as Crisis Manager: Patterns and 
Prospects, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 11. 
5 G. Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community, Westmead, Saxon House, 1977, p. 
16. 
6 H. Carrapico & A. Barrinha, ‘The EU as a Coherent (Cyber)Security Actor?’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 1254-1261. 
7 Ibid., pp. 1257. 
8 Ibid., pp. 1254-1261. 
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However, in order to accurately measure institutionalisation, it is necessary to 
supplement coherence with a second approach. Baird merges the concepts of 
‘functional integration’ and ‘actorness’, coining the term ‘functional actorness’.9 Just 
as functional integration refers to a process of spillover which achieves European 
integration incrementally, functional actorness denotes a gradual increase in 
integration which in turn empowers the EU to act externally. According to this model, 
‘functional power’ is determined by 1) the degree of homogeneity in border security, 
2) the capacity or incapacity to control borders and exert influence, and 3) the results 
of the first two factors in the third country concerned. What Baird refers to as 
‘homogeneity’ or ‘symmetry’ overlaps with Carrapico and Barrinha’s concept of 
institutional coordination or coherence.  
These two frameworks can therefore be linked together, with ‘coherence’ as a 
common indicator, supplemented by Baird’s inclusion of ‘capacities’ and ‘external 
outcomes’.10 What emerges is a hybrid framework in which the degree of 
institutionalisation in border assistance missions will be measured using three indicators: 
1) Institutional Coordination/Coherence, 2) New Capacities/Competences, and 3) 
External Outcomes.  
These indicators are often interdependent.  For example, as more competences shift 
to the supranational level, coherence is expected to increase because less of the 
policy area concerned is left to the member states’ discretion. As agencies like 
FRONTEX and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) have shown, the need for 
policy mainstreaming or coordination between member states may lead to the 
creation of new agencies or mechanisms. This would involve both an increase in 
institutional coherence and the development of new capacities. In fact, this 
interdependence makes the indicators at times difficult to differentiate in a clear-cut 
manner, rendering the assessment more intricate.  
Table 1 summarises the hybrid framework of institutionalisation and further breaks 
down the three indicators. ‘Institutional Coordination/Coherence’ adheres to 
Carrapico and Barrinha’s definition of vertical and horizontal coherence. The following 
two indicators – ‘New Capacities/Competences’ and ‘External Outcomes’ together 
complete the EU’s functional actorness – in other words, its ability not only to 
                                                          
9 T. Baird, ‘Functional Actorness? Border Security in the EU and Turkey’, International Journal of 
Public Administration, vol. 38, no. 12, 2015, pp. 849-851. 
10 Ibid. 
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institutionalise IBM, but also to externalise it as a result of its increased capacities. New 
capacities may manifest themselves in the form of new institutions or an increased 
mandate for existing institutions, as well as new EU-level law and policy. External 
outcomes refer to the EU’s ability to use said coherence and new capacities to 
achieve results in a third country or region. As will be shown later, this may result in the 
creation of new institutions and policies in the third country. However, it is worth 
considering that these new developments mean that the external context with which 
the EU interacts changes, causing the EU to adapt to its changed surroundings once 
again (and so on). 
Table 1: Analytical framework to assess the institutionalisation of externalised IBM11 
Institutional Coordination/Coherence (Carrapico & Barrinha, 2017) 
Vertical  
 between EU and member-state levels 
 between member states bilaterally 
(resulting from EU-member state 
coordination) 
Horizontal 
 between and within EU institutions 
- policy mainstreaming 
- internal-external gap 
 between institutions within the same 
member state 
New Capacities/Competences (Baird, 2015) 
 creation of new transnational institutions/agencies 
 enhanced mandate/resources for existing institutions/agencies 
 EU-level policy and legislation (Regulations vs. Directives) 
External Outcomes (Baird, 2015) 
 coordination and policy convergence between EU/member states and third 
country as a result of EU influence 
 third country influence on the EU  
Source: compiled by the author. 
Therefore, successful institutionalisation will be determined through increased 
coherence, the adoption of EU-level laws and policies, the creation of new institutions 
or an increased mandate, and the achievement of more effective results in relations 
with third countries. Stagnation would indicate that mass migration has had an 
insignificant effect on EU integration while disintegration would entail a decrease in 
each indicator. It must not be taken for granted that the refugee crisis is accelerating 
the communautarisation process, nor that it is the one and only catalyst for such 
integration. The possibility of a spill-back effect in certain areas should therefore be 
taken into account. It is not only third countries such as Libya and Turkey which 
                                                          
11 For further details, see M. Bonnici Bennett, Institutionalisation as a Result of External Triggers? 
The Refugee Crisis and the EU’s Externalisation of Integrated Border Management to 
Neighbouring Buffer States, Master’s thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2018.  
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Europeanise their behaviour through conditionality. Third countries have their own 
foreign policies based on national interests and may resist the EU’s influence or even 
slow down or reverse the EU integration process by rejecting such interventions and 
using their bargaining power. It is here that the decentred (non-Eurocentric) approach 
must be upheld to demonstrate how external factors influence EU integration.12  
The final assessment will be based on a scale ranging from weak to moderate and 
strong. Full or nearly full supranationalisation or undeniably drastic convergence since 
the crisis will indicate ‘strong’ institutionalisation. ‘Moderate’ institutionalisation can be 
said to have been achieved where clear progress has been made since the crisis 
although some incoherence persists. The level of institutionalisation will be classified as 
‘weak’ if strong levels of incoherence and low cooperation can be identified before 
and after the crisis, or if the indicators have regressed since its onset. In both case 
studies, the assessments of each indicator will be aggregated into an overall average 
of weak, moderate or strong. 
The Development of Integrated Border Management  
While keeping the indicators in mind, this section provides a general chronological 
overview of EU capabilities in border management both before and after the 2011 
Arab Spring and 2015 refugee crisis. This will provide sufficient context regarding the 
tools, mechanisms, laws and policies the EU has in place before delving into the 
specific cases of Libya and Turkey. It is also important to note how such capacities 
developed over time. 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) gradually shifted to a European level following the 1985 
Schengen Agreement and 1986 Single European Act (SEA). It was not until the SEA 
removed internal frontiers to ensure free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital that attention was drawn to variations in immigration and asylum procedures 
across Europe, encouraging intergovernmental cooperation. The 1990 Schengen 
Agreement abolished internal frontiers and established common external border and 
visa policies.13 In contrast to its predecessor, the 1990 Agreement adopted the 
‘compensatory measures’ mentality of its time, while the notion of AFSJ came about 
as a flanking measure to the internal market. This still left room for à la carte 
cooperation with the UK, Ireland and Denmark. EU immigration, asylum and border 
                                                          
12 Ibid. 
13 Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, op. cit., pp. 114-118. 
Melanie Bonnici Bennett 
10 
policy was fully communautarised by the Amsterdam Treaty which moved this policy 
area to the first pillar or Community method. This entailed the involvement of the 
Commission in decision-making. Thus, the Schengen acquis became fully integrated 
into the EU structures.14 Several internal processes, as well as external crises, were 
therefore already scaling up the level of integration in border management long 
before the Arab Spring.  
The 1999 Tampere European Council developed the first common migration and 
asylum policy in the EU while the 2002 Seville Summit on illegal immigration adopted a 
number of steps towards an integrated approach to border management. These 
included improved coordination and cooperation, integrated risk analysis, common 
burden sharing laws and basic standards. EU external borders soon witnessed a big 
bang expansion towards new member states with untested border security capacities. 
Talk of border management was reinvigorated in the Hague and Stockholm 
Programmes and spurred the creation of information databases such as the Schengen 
Information System (SIS), its successor (SIS II), the Visa Information System (VIS) and the 
European Asylum Dactyloscopy database (EURODAC).15 
Institutional Coherence 
The elimination of internal borders only served to strengthen the urgency of 
standardising external border controls. Securitisation was further reinforced by external 
threats such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, emphasising the need to tackle immigration 
through an integrated approach. Following 9/11, differing interpretations of Schengen 
rules prevented the adoption of standardised laws and practices, rendering the 
common external frontier vulnerable. A coherent approach was needed to tackle 
irregular immigration and cross-border crime, especially in light of the ‘big bang’ 
enlargement which would incorporate new states into the Schengen area. At Italy’s 
request, a European Border Police was proposed to coordinate national operational 
centres. The UK opposed the creation of a supranational structure and the 2001 
Laeken European Council avoided any reference to an integrated EU border guard, 
alluding instead to cooperation between external border controls and the possibility 
of a common mechanism. The Italian feasibility study, which proposed a network 
model in a system of ‘knots’, resulted in several joint operations coordinated by the 
European Corps of Border Guards (ECBG) which was meant to support but not replace 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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national services.16 The heads of border guards of each Schengen member state 
initially cooperated within the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and 
Asylum (SCIFA+) although doubts quickly arose about its capacities to fulfil its 
objectives, resulting in the establishment of FRONTEX in 2004.17 
Although these advances occurred well before the Arab Spring, they confirm that 
external threats played a hand in the development of IBM. Today, EU border security 
remains highly fragmented, operating through multiple institutions and jurisdictions 
which the FRONTEX coordinates.18 Moreover, the Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) continues to discourage inter-state cooperation. Member states are able to 
become part of Schengen and opt out of the CEAS, creating free-riding issues as 
Denmark’s opt out of all EU asylum instruments except for the Dublin Regulation. This 
allowed Denmark to slash its social security benefits to refugees to persuade them to 
seek help elsewhere, while it also failed to relocate some 160,000 asylum-seekers from 
Greece and Italy.19  
On the other hand, 2011 also saw the creation of the European Agency for the 
Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the AFSJ (EU-LISA) to ensure 
administrative cooperation between relevant member state departments. EU-LISA is a 
regulatory agency with legal personality and currently manages the EURODAC 
database to monitor asylum applications, the SIS II for information sharing in 
international crime investigations, and the VIS for the processing of visa applications 
and other border entry procedures. 
On 19 June 2018, the Bulgarian Presidency and the European Parliament Rapporteur 
managed to conclude a number of outstanding issues related to the EURODAC 
Regulation as one of the seven legislative proposals composing the future reformed 
CEAS. These issues concerned data transfers in third countries for returns and obtaining 
biometric data from minors. An agreement was also reached on the Resettlement 
Regulation, Reception Conditions Directive and Qualification Regulation proposals. 
However, when presented to COREPER on 19-20 June 2018 these did not obtain the 
required support from member states. The Austrian Presidency in the second half of 
                                                          
16 Feasibility Study for the Setting Up of a European Border Police, Final Report, Rome, 30 May 
2002. 
17 V. Moreno-Lax, Accessing Asylum in Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 42-44. 
18 Baird, op. cit., p. 856. 
19 M. Den Jeijer, J. Rijpma & T. Spijkerboer, ‘Coercion, Prohibition, and Great Expectations: The 
Continuing Failure of the Common European Asylum System’, Common Market Law Review, 
vol. 53, no. 4, 2016, p. 614. 
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2018 undertook the task of holding meetings to address outstanding issues among 
member states and present a compromise to the European Parliament. However, the 
Parliament has so far insisted on the provisional agreement originally reached in June. 
Bilateral meetings between the Austrian Presidency and EU member states continue 
with a view to developing a Council position on the Dublin Regulation, particularly 
regarding new approaches to disembarkation and new forms of solidarity providing 
aid to member states under pressure.20 
At first glance, coordination seems relatively weak, relying on voluntary contributions 
from member states, and the rise of populism does not bode well for European 
integration. However, with the strengthening of FRONTEX, the establishment of EU-LISA 
and ongoing CEAS reforms, institutional coherence can be cautiously classified as 
moderate. 
New Capacities 
It is questionable whether FRONTEX can be considered an autonomous actor in EU 
asylum and immigration policy. Although its budget and staff have drastically 
increased since the onset of the refugee crisis, the Agency’s activities are heavily 
dependent on the member states. The original Regulation establishing FRONTEX was 
limited to a coordinating or facilitative role while member states retained full control 
over their external borders. However, FRONTEX’s coordinating role endows it with some 
responsibility for the result of joint missions. The division of responsibilities between 
member states and FRONTEX has been a highly contentious issue, particularly in cases 
where migrants have perished during a joint operation coordinated by the Agency.21 
A Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE) was also developed 
to facilitate responses to member states’ calls for help. However, this was dependent 
on a voluntary pool of member state surveillance and control equipment. During the 
Arab Spring, the CRATE system was reinforced with materials owned or co-owned by 
FRONTEX as well as a rapid reaction equipment pool in 2016.22 
FRONTEX possesses very few own resources and relies on member states for officers, 
ships and helicopters. In 2007, interior ministers agreed on establishing Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams (RABIT) to equip the Agency with 450 national experts that could 
                                                          
20 European Asylum Support Office, ‘Recent Developments in EU Asylum and Migration Policy’, 
Policy Update, EASO Executive Office, no. 14, 18 September-31 October 2018. 
21 S. Léonard, ‘EU Border Security and Migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and 
Securitisation through Practices’, European Security, vol. 19, no. 2, 2010, pp. 231-254. 
22 Moreno-Lax, op. cit., pp. 31-37. 
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be made available at short notice. Contrary to FRONTEX’s usual voluntary pools, all 
member states are required to participate in RABIT and to mobilise their resources 
when requested by a fellow member state. Eventually, 2010 saw the first request for 
assistance due to unprecedented migrant inflows, leading to the first ever deployment 
at the Greek-Turkish border. It is worth noting that as early as 2009 various RABIT 
exercises and training courses were already taking place before any state had 
requested its deployment.23 
The 2016 European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) Regulation, which was 
negotiated in merely nine months, endowed FRONTEX with the right to intervene in 
member states overwhelmed by migrant influxes – a competence which was 
previously rejected in 2002.24 All member states within the Council agreed that such 
competences were necessary as circumstances had changed. It was no longer a 
question of whether or not to make such changes, but rather of how to implement 
them.25 There has therefore been a very strong increase in new capacities, and the 
record pace at which FRONTEX’s mandate and resources are expanding shows no 
signs of slowing down. Just two years after the 2016 Regulation, the European 
Commission has submitted a Proposal for a Regulation to further strengthen the EBCG 
on 12 September 2018. It also proposed a standing corps of ten thousand border 
guards and to nearly triple funding for migration and border management in the next 
Multi-annual Financial Framework for the 2021-2027 period. Moreover, 12 June 2018 
marked a new Commission proposal for an Asylum and Migration Fund, Border 
Management Instrument and Internal Security Fund which would amount to €20.9 
billion.26 
Although FRONTEX remains highly reliant on member state contributions, the 
constantly accelerating rate at which its mandate is expanding boosts its capacities 
to a moderate position, with the potential of becoming stronger in the future. 
                                                          
23 Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, op. cit., p. 118. 
24 T. Emiliani & A. Linck, “The External Dimension of EU Immigration Policies: Reacting to External 
Events?”, in C. Damro, S. Gstöhl & S. Schunz (eds.), The European Union’s Evolving External 
Engagement – Towards New Sectoral Diplomacies?, Abingdon, Routledge, 2018, p. 132. 
25 Interview with Florian Geyer, Policy Assistant to the Director-General for Migration and Home 
Affairs (DG HOME, European Commission), Brussels, 30 April 2018. 
26 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and Repealing Council Joint Action no. 
98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) no. 1052/3013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EU) no. 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council’, COM(2018) 631 
final, 12 September 2018, Brussels. 
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External Outcomes 
The emergence of external action in and of itself implies a form of functional spillover. 
So-called Regional Protection Programmes were adopted by the European 
Commission in 2004, aimed at supporting areas around the globe with high refugee 
populations, and proposals were made to establish asylum processing centres in buffer 
states to tackle influxes outside EU territory.27 IBM is being externalised not only through 
the exchange of data with third parties but through direct collaboration with them 
through extraterritorial checks and pre-border interdiction by FRONTEX.28 During the 
negotiations leading to the Schengen acquis, the 1998 Austrian Presidency 
emphasised that border control must include countries of origin and transit.29 The 
resistance that met this proposal at the time suggested an aversion to the 
communautarisation of EU external action in border and immigration policy.  
A ‘concentric circles’ model was adopted, where the member states formed the core, 
candidate countries aligning their border legislation with the Schengen acquis formed 
the second circle, and transit countries contributing to enhanced transit checks 
formed the third tier. The outermost layer would be composed of countries of origin 
which were left with the responsibility of eliminating root causes of migration.30 In an 
attempt to cover the entire migration cycle, the concentric circles model aimed to 
implement ‘pre-border’ measures.31 The 2016 Regulation amending FRONTEX 
emphasised the four-tier access control model composed of measures in third 
countries, collaboration with neighbouring countries, border control measures at EU 
external borders, and measures within the Schengen area itself. It empowered 
FRONTEX to implement a strategy for relations with third countries and international 
organisations and to assist member states in acquiring travel documents for 
deportations by cooperating with third-country authorities. FRONTEX has signed 
Working Agreements with police in border surveillance, providing third countries with 
intelligence, funding and capacity-building.32 
                                                          
27 Boin, Ekengren & Rhinard, op. cit., p. 116. 
28 Moreno-Lax, op. cit., pp. 42-44. 
29 Council of the EU, ‘Strategic Paper on Immigration and Asylum Policy’, Council doc. 9809/98, 
Brussels, 1 July 1998. 
30 Moreno-Lax, op. cit., pp.31-44. 
31 Ibid. 
32 European Union, ‘Regulation 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard’, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 251/1, art. 64(3). 
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There has therefore been a moderate functional spillover of internal policy into the 
external dimension. However, results may vary depending on the third country 
concerned.  
Overall, IBM at EU level has been institutionalised to a moderate to strong degree since 
the onset of the 2011 Arab Spring and 2015 refugee crisis. A significant correlation can 
be found between the two events and the EU integration process. The following two 
case studies concerning Libya and Turkey will examine the rate at which the 
institutionalisation process has developed. 
Libya as Europe’s New Border 
In the midst of instability in the Southern Mediterranean, Libya has remained an 
enigma with no single entity holding de facto power on the ground so far. Conflict 
between the democratically elected Tobruk government in the East recognised by 
the United Nations (UN) and the General National Congress (GNC) based in Tripoli is 
ongoing. The power vacuum left after Gaddafi’s assassination in 2011 has made Libya 
vulnerable to channels of human smuggling with the southern desert region being 
used as a major transit area.33 
Institutional Coherence 
Despite revisions of the asylum Directives between 2011 and 2013, EU asylum law still 
does not comprise harmonised standards on procedures and asylum status. The very 
fact that they are Directives and not Regulations leaves room for incoherence, as 
these must be implemented into national law by the member states, relegating EU 
legislation to a basic threshold.34 Refugee status itself poses a dilemma as it provides 
equal treatment in public services like education, social welfare and healthcare, all of 
which fall within national competences.  
Vertical incoherence between the EU and national levels due to a lack of 
supranational standards implies inter-state incoherence, competitive behaviour and 
refusal to cooperate in emergencies. Italy and Malta have proven to be a classic 
example, clashing over issues concerning territorial waters in the absence of a 
supranational settlement mechanism. A phone conversation leaked by the Italian 
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press in 2017 revealed that pleas for help from migrants off the coast of Lampedusa in 
2013 went unaided as Maltese and Italian authorities insisted the sinking vessel was 
positioned in the other’s jurisdiction.35 As it stands, the Dublin Regulation encourages 
avoidance behaviour, with member states attempting to shirk asylum processing 
responsibilities that accompany being the first point of contact. In the summer of 2018, 
another standoff between Italy and Malta involving the migrant rescue ship MV Lifeline 
saw 234 migrants stranded at sea for six days as Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini 
closed Italy’s ports, insisting that Malta pulls its weight.36 The vessel was finally allowed 
to dock in Malta, following Italy’s and Malta’s accusations against the captain of the 
boat for violating international law by picking up migrants in Libyan waters. Permission 
to dock was granted to the ship following an ad hoc initiative by eight EU member 
states agreeing to distribute the migrants amongst themselves, after which the vessel 
was impounded and the captain arraigned in court for entering Maltese territorial 
waters illegally and for vessel registration irregularities. Italy’s new ‘closed door’ policy 
under a populist government is redirecting the migration flow to Morocco, giving the 
non-EU country new leverage in its bilateral negotiations with Spain.37 
Hence, all cooperation efforts are based on voluntary ad hoc arrangements between 
states. In 2017, Italy violated the non-refoulement principle by promising funding, 
training and equipment to Libyan authorities to curb refugee influxes. Efforts have 
been made to institutionalise or harmonise asylum laws and procedures through the 
Commission’s reform goals, mutual recognition of asylum decisions, Dublin reform and 
the establishment of a common asylum code. A common list of safe countries of origin 
was released to speed up the application process; however, the Procedures Directive 
still enables member states to decide whether to process applications from said safe 
countries.38   
Coordination under FRONTEX seems to have greatly improved, although the ceding 
of national sovereignty in border management to a supranational agency remains 
highly controversial in national armed forces. Malta has reduced its efforts in Operation 
Triton and is not contributing to Operation Themis, which shifted Italian patrols to 
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Malta’s North, West and East, leaving its southern border exposed. However, Malta has 
maintained its liaison officers to ensure coordination with the mission. Operation Themis 
emerged as a direct result of migratory pressures from Libya.39 Through the mission 
EUNAVFORMED Operation Sophia under the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), Maltese and Italian forces cooperate by training Libyan coastguards in Malta 
and Italy. However, the unstable political situation in Libya has forced Malta to end its 
participation in the CSDP border assistance mission (EUBAM) Libya.40 
It was only after the Arab Spring and 2013 Lampedusa boat wreck that the European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) was established to enable cooperation and 
intelligence sharing between states and FRONTEX through a system of interlinked 
nodes. A Council press release stated that the EUROSUR Regulation was adopted 
“without discussion”, suggesting that recent developments had increased the 
willingness of member states to comply, thereby accelerating the integration 
process.41 Negotiations had begun long before the infamous Lampedusa wreck; 
however, this tragedy likely gave member states the final push to reach an 
agreement.42  
In the Libyan case, the Arab Spring has introduced more disintegration than 
coherence due to a lack of common standards and disagreements between 
member states, as seen in Italy’s and Malta’s continued lack of cooperation around 
Lampedusa both before the 2018 Italian general elections and after. In the absence 
of a European response, member states resort to unilateral measures. The CEAS and 
Dublin Regulation are severely outdated as they are not adapted to present needs. 
Without burden sharing and unified external border management, member states feel 
forced to suspend the Schengen agreement and avoid being the first point of entry 
for migrants. With Salvini as Minister of Interior, Italy has closed its ports to migrant 
vessels, prompting Spain to offer to take in stranded boats while ad hoc arrangements 
persist. With the EUROSUR mechanism and common training under EUNAVFORMED to 
Libya’s north, however, collaboration between member states is improving and Malta 
continues to coordinate with Operation Themis despite not participating. Overall, 
Libya remains a rather weak area of EU coherence in externalised IBM and even 
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displays signs of regression, as member states revert to unilateral measures or 
cooperate in an ad hoc fashion outside of the EU framework.  
New Capacities  
The Rabat and Khartoum Processes make a strong case for an emerging Justice and 
Home Affairs diplomacy as the European External Action Service (EEAS) was involved 
from the very start of the Khartoum negotiations and so seems to have assumed further 
autonomy. The Rabat Process (Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development) 
is a regional migration dialogue linking Central, Western and Northern Africa with 
Europe, thereby bringing together countries of origin, transit and destination. The 
Khartoum Process addresses human trafficking and smuggling in the Horn of Africa, 
arguably showing the beginnings of the EU’s security-oriented objectives pushed by 
national interior ministers. Under the framework of the 2015 Joint Valletta Summit on 
Migration, the EU Trust Fund for Africa has funded a Regional Operational Centre for 
the Khartoum Process to facilitate joint investigations in the region and beyond. The 
infrastructure, legal basis and staff, such as focal points and liaison officers, are in the 
process of being determined.43 In November 2018, a Senior Officials Meeting was held 
in the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa to take stock of the implementation 
of the Joint Valletta Action Plan, gathering representatives from African and European 
countries and organisations which are party to the Khartoum and Rabat Processes. 
Interestingly, FRONTEX and Europol were listed under ‘European Union’ in the 
participants’ list by the implementing organisation, the International Centre for 
Migration Policy Development, while EASO was listed under ‘Organisations’.44 This 
demonstrates that individual EU agencies continue to be given different treatment in 
international settings and suggests that the international presence of border and 
security-related EU agencies are more advanced than those concerned with asylum. 
In 2011, High Representative Catherine Ashton opened a liaison office in Benghazi to 
support Libyan democracy, border management and security reform and an EEAS 
mission prepared for the establishment of an EU Delegation to liaise with the National 
Transitional Council.45 However, domestic unrest in Libya led to decreased on-the-
ground presence of international and EU institutions. In 2014, the EU Delegation in Libya 
was moved to Tunisia. Border management efforts mainly occur in surrounding regions 
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like the Sahel and the Mediterranean rather than Libya itself. The EU currently has no 
association agreement with Libya, which has also remained outside most of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).46 In March 2017, the EU was welcomed by the 
League of Arab States, the African Union and the UN to form a Quartet for 
coordination on Libyan border security. Due to this being an area firmly planted in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/CSDP, the EU was represented by High 
Representative Federica Mogherini. 
To optimise information gathering and data sharing between EU bodies, CSDP mission 
Operation Sophia located at Libya’s Northern sea border is being equipped with 
additional staff to cooperate with the Crime Information Cell in crime prevention, 
investigation and prosecution. Meanwhile, the CSDP mission EUBAM Libya deployed 
at the southern border has managed to establish itself – albeit rather superficially with 
five operational staff deployed in Tripoli on rotation.47 
In policy-making, so-called ‘venue shopping’ has emerged as a means of seeking to 
gain more influence and amplify one’s voice by choosing the optimal platform, in this 
case EU institutions, in which to negotiate. Venue shopping has been used by small 
states like Greece, Cyprus and Malta collaborating with Italy, which since 2008 have 
become highly proactive and influential. Former Maltese Minister of Interior Carmelo 
Mifsud mobilised the ‘Quadro Group’ to speak with one voice and lobby for burden 
sharing in the JHA and General Affairs Councils. The Quartet’s qualms were taken up 
by the 2009 European Council following intense pressure, especially from the Maltese 
government.48 These countries’ political priorities were therefore ‘uploaded’ to the 
European level. 
Opposite to venue shopping, the EU itself has benefited from funding its member states 
to take the lead in negotiations and joint operations on its behalf.49 In 2017, €46.3 
million was contracted under the EU Trust Fund between the Commission and Italy to 
be spent on a border management programme across Libyan borders. In its bilateral 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Presidential Council and Government of 
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National Accord (GNA), Italy pledged to complete a border control system in 
Southern Libya, including reception centres.50 This Memorandum served as a mouth-
piece for Euro-African relations regarding the elimination of root causes of migration.  
However, it is difficult to conclude whether the refugee crisis was the main influencer 
in the integration process. It seems that the EUROSUR Regulation, for instance, would 
have materialised as part of a natural integration process regardless of the events that 
unfolded near Lampedusa or Greece. However, the events of 2013 likely did 
accelerate the process, with the Regulation being approved urgently within the same 
month. On the other hand, the 2016 EBCG Regulation that was negotiated, 
concluded and adopted in nine months emerges as a clear sign of external influence 
when contrasted with the first founding Regulation which had come into effect in 2004 
and had limited the agency to facilitating “operational cooperation between 
member states and third countries”.51  
Prior to the Arab Spring and the Syrian war, member states refused to empower 
FRONTEX with the right to intervene, whereas afterwards it no longer remained a 
contentious issue and member states displayed a greater willingness to cooperate. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the refugee crisis has had a nearly negligible effect on 
FRONTEX’s mandate, which now allows it to engage with third countries but still largely 
limits it to a coordinative role through standardisation of border guard training and 
joint operations. Moreover, its missions continue to depend heavily on member state 
assets. Although the closure of embassies in Libya and the EU Delegation’s move to 
Tunis have indicated de-institutionalisation and isolated Libya further, countries like 
Malta are looking to re-engage with the country, even appointing a new resident 
ambassador to Libya. Therefore, EU-level capacities have become weak to moderate 
in Libya. 
External Outcomes 
Smugglers interviewed by journalists have claimed that suspending rescue operations 
to discourage migrants from crossing the Mediterranean had no impact.52 Demand 
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for smugglers, and hence the price of the trip, increases in parts of the voyage that 
are war-torn or difficult to cross alone, mainly from Sudan to Southern Libya and in the 
Mediterranean.53 In the absence of economic institutions and a central government, 
the Fezzan region’s illicit economy is thriving.54  
Libya is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its authorities in the early 
2000s deported or detained migrants, disregarding their asylum rights. Gaddafi’s 
border policy towards the African neighbours, even before the revolts, needs to be 
taken into account. Well before the Arab Spring and the absence of a centralised 
government, he was largely responsible for the porosity of Libyan borders due to his 
Pan-African approach, open-door policy and collusion with smugglers. These factors 
made Libya a popular migrant destination even before 2011. This means there was 
scant border management to begin with, meaning it must be built or developed from 
scratch. The southern border remains porous and unregulated due to the vast 
stretches of desert land that remain unguarded, leading it to be dubbed “Europe’s 
new border”.55 Even as a failed state, Libya has exerted influence on the EU, affecting 
the outcome of its migration and asylum policy. Border assistance missions have on 
the whole been ineffective due to the absence of a common Libyan government to 
deploy border guards and stop transnational crime.  
Libya is the ultimate proof that the domestic situation and geographic factors greatly 
affect the EU’s ability to set up new bodies or even to be present in the area. EUBAM 
Libya’s effectiveness down south remains minimal and despite efforts to develop an 
IBM strategy, a Libyan Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre has not yet been 
established. There seems to be a light at the end of the tunnel, however. During talks 
between rival leaders called by French President Emmanuel Macron, the GNA, House 
of Representatives, High Council of State and Libyan National Army agreed to general 
elections. Although originally planned for December 2018, they have now been 
postponed to 2019.56 External outcomes remain rather weak as progress is slow. Table 
2 summarises the findings for the case study of Libya. 
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Table 2: Level of Institutionalisation of Externalised IBM in Libya 
Institutional Coordination/Coherence (Carrapico & Barrinha, 2017) 
Vertical  
= weak, possible reversal  
Horizontal 
= weak 
New Capacities/Competences (Baird, 2015) 
= weak-moderate 
External Outcomes (Baird, 2015) 
= weak 
Overall Assessment: weak 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
Turkey’s Candidacy: Whose Conditionality Is It Really? 
Contrary to Libya, Turkey is not merely a buffer state but a candidate country with 
prospects of one day forming part of EU territory, thereby expanding the EU’s external 
borders. This possibility heightened the urgency of EU border assistance in the region, 
especially since Turkey has become a popular transit route for Syrian asylum-seekers 
and the world’s largest refugee hosting country. Even at the pre-accession stage, 
Turkey forms part of the EU’s ‘economic borders’ through its participation in the 
customs union.57 
Since Turkey’s candidacy for EU accession was accepted in 1999, the EU has 
transformed Turkish policies as the candidate country adopts reforms to meet pre-
accession criteria. EU external cooperation focuses on centralising Turkish border 
control actors under an Integrated Border Management Bureau and the AKP 
government has been pressured since 2002 to approximate its border security 
infrastructure to EU standards. However, it is not only the EU’s influence which has 
mobilised reforms as Turkey has also experienced domestic pressures following the 
Syrian conflict and border management reform has been delayed.58  
Institutional Coherence 
When Europe was faced with an unprecedented influx in 2015, the EU turned to Turkey 
in an attempt to nip the issue closer to the bud. Amnesty International claimed that 
asylum applications were being rejected through a fast-track procedure based on the 
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assumption that Turkey was a safe country to return to.59 The Greek appeals 
committee previously halted deportations of Syrians based on violations of the non-
refoulement principle, ruling Turkey as unsafe and blocking the EU-Turkey deal of 18 
March 2016 aimed at stemming the influx of migrants transiting to Europe through 
Turkey.60 
On the other hand, the Visegrád countries have not joined fellow member states in 
relocating migrants from Italy and Greece, violating their obligations under the 
Council Decisions adopted in 2015 prior to the EU-Turkey deal. Hungary, Poland and 
the Czech Republic faced legal action by the Commission for their negligence and in 
2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) overruled Hungarian and 
Slovakian objections to the Commission’s mandatory quotas. In 2016, the EU allowed 
member states to suspend their visa-free regime for six months due to a rise in asylum 
requests from Turkish nationals following the attempted coup d’état in July of that year. 
Germany, on the other hand, granted asylum to Turkish military personnel, jeopardising 
German-Turkish relations and forcing Germany to transfer its military forces to Jordan 
after the Turkish government refused to allow German lawmakers to visit the troops.61 
Despite requiring member states to return asylum-seekers to the first point of arrival, the 
Dublin Regulation was suspended by Germany to enable it to process asylum 
applications. Germany’s open door policy encouraged migrants to make their way to 
Germany using the Balkan and Turkish route. Member states began unilaterally closing 
their borders in reaction to the EU’s failure to tackle the crisis, making Germany the 
only state with open borders and leaving its Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
(BAMF) severely overwhelmed.62 Chancellor Merkel’s open door policy came to an 
end following criticism from her party which lost significant support to the far-right.  
Turkey has functioning bilateral readmission agreements with Greece and Bulgaria 
which were negotiated outside the EU framework long before the EU-Turkey 
readmission agreement and the refugee crisis. The fact that a readmission agreement 
was finally negotiated at an EU level rather than bilaterally indicates that the Syrian 
crisis inspired efforts to improve coherence. However, bilateral relations remain a 
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pivotal point in Turkey’s migration management policy. Turkey has restricted the 
movement of Syrians under temporary protection to prevent them from crossing to 
Greece. Problems have arisen however, as Greece was accused of violating the EU-
Turkey deal as it often claimed to have more returnable refugees than it did.63 Hence, 
there is not only a lack of vertical and inter-state coordination, but also lack of external 
coherence between the EU and Turkey as well as individual member states and Turkey.  
Recent developments, however, show that great strides have now been made in the 
area of Resettlement through a new Resettlement Support Facility project in Turkey 
which is foreseen to be operational by March 2019. In October 2017, EU member states 
suggested possible actions to be taken with regards to coordination and possible 
sharing of resources among member states. An EASO feasibility study identified Turkey 
as the ideal location for the development for such a pilot project. Six member states 
are participating in the pilot project, which is aimed at enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the current resettlement processing from Turkey. 
Turkish border management has become more coherent with EU practices due to the 
country’s accession objectives. However, Turkey still relies on bilateral agreements with 
neighbouring member states such as Greece. Although the fact that Germany and 
the Netherlands were leading the negotiations for the EU-Turkey deal may be seen as 
proof of the EU’s lack of actorness (to be analysed further later), it also demonstrates 
increased coherence, since the EU has empowered its member states to speak with 
one voice on its behalf. EU coherence in Turkey can therefore be classified as strong. 
New Capacities 
Although the 2016 EU-Turkey deal may be considered part of an emerging EU sectoral 
diplomacy in JHA, negotiations were mainly led by Germany and the Netherlands and 
are therefore debatable as evidence of supranationalisation.64 Germany wanted to 
contribute more as the largest receiving EU nation in terms of migrants, while the 
Netherlands took charge as the Council Presidency. This demonstrates the continuing 
presence of the intergovernmental Council in external relations. Greece was also 
instrumental in negotiations through its intensive talks with Turkey in December 2015 
and March 2016. It may be argued that member states were respecting the principle 
of solidarity, and therefore acting in a coherent manner, in representing the EU. As 
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seen with Italy’s Memorandum of Understanding with Libya, a new trend has arisen in 
which the EU delegates foreign policy initiatives to member states, providing funding 
and other support for those states to conclude agreements on Europe’s behalf. At first 
glance, this may seem like a loss of EU capacities. However, it may in fact be a new 
manifestation of supranationalisation. Yet, the multiplicity of actors concerned 
indicates that EU-Turkey negotiations on border management have not been fully 
institutionalised and competences remain fragmented. 
The EU-Turkey deal was later proclaimed as not legally binding by the EU due to fears 
that judicial complications might arise under international law. The General Court 
announced that the actions brought by three asylum-seekers against the EU-Turkey 
deal were beyond its jurisdiction, as it was not the EU which concluded the deal but 
its member states.65 By issuing the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 as a press 
release, national heads of state and government were able to circumvent Treaty 
provisions on EU treaty-making and exclude the European Parliament from the 
decision-making process. Intergovernmental approaches allow the creation of non-
legally binding deals, dodging judicial review on the rights of asylum-seekers.66 In this 
case, a process of de-institutionalisation took place through the shirking of human 
rights responsibilities.  
Slow decision-making within EU institutions is also to blame for progress moving at a 
glacial pace, firing up frustration in Turkey. The one-to-one deal component of the EU-
Turkey deal, in which one Syrian in Turkey will be resettled in the EU for every migrant 
arriving in Greece who is returned to Turkey, has been respected by both parties. 
However, only €1.9 billion of the €3 billion promised to Turkey have been spent so far - 
Turkey alone having spent €30 billion.67 A Commission proposal has been submitted for 
an additional €3 billion for the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey, a billion of which would 
come from the EU budget and two-thirds from the member states.68 Major 
disagreements have arisen within the Council as member states are pressuring the 
Commission to cover the entire fund and disagreeing over its regional distribution.69 
Moreover, the voluntary admissions scheme, which helped Turkish officials to convince 
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Syrian migrants to remain in Turkey and wait for a new legal route to the EU, has not 
yet materialised two years after it was announced.70  
Turkey has maintained good relations with FRONTEX already before the refugee crisis 
in anticipation of its accession. Cooperation with FRONTEX and all member states is 
ensured through a Memorandum of Understanding. There has been close 
cooperation through Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) 
programmes to bring Turkish legislation and standards in line with EU rules. Coastguards 
and patrol cars are partly financed by the EU as part of the EU-Turkey deal, along with 
increased naval security measures.71 A 2018 Commission report on Turkey portrayed 
migration and asylum policy as the most positive aspect of the candidate country’s 
progress in the AFSJ during its pre-accession process. Following the coup attempt, 
cooperation shows signs of recovery.72  
During the 2010 Arab Spring, FRONTEX’s RABIT mechanism, which obliges member 
states to provide aid upon a fellow member state’s request, was activated for the first 
time since its inception as Greece suffered from exceptional migratory pressures. The 
mission built on the 2010 Poseidon Land joint operation by reinforcing deployment, 
while Poseidon Land 2011 took over following the termination of the RABIT operation 
to continue patrolling the Greek-Turkish frontier. Objectives of RABIT operations and 
possible operational cooperation measures were identified, such as transnational 
police cooperation and National Contact Points on both sides of the border.73  
Overall, EU competences in negotiations with Turkey remain fragmented between the 
EU and its various member states. But is there a need for a ‘single mouthpiece’ as long 
as all actors ‘speak with one voice’? Moreover, EU aid deployed in Turkey, including 
TAIEX programmes and the first ever RABIT mission, demonstrate that EU-level 
capacities in Turkey have become moderate.  
External Outcomes 
The rate at which reforms have occurred in Turkey and the directions these changes 
have taken have been inconsistent. The IBM Bureau’s attempts to unite various 
organisations under a centralised mandate have failed to materialise within the 
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stipulated timeframe. That said, the Turkish Ministry of Interior has now developed a 
Directorate-General of Migration Management which coordinates reception centres 
and participates regularly in EU capacity-building activities. Turkish border control is 
fragmented under separate jurisdictions. Hence, Turkish legal norms in integrated 
border management are diffused across various administrations and bureaucratic 
tools, leading the EU to push for centralisation.74 
It may be argued that EU border assistance was not caused by the refugee crisis but 
by a need to harmonise policies in anticipation of possible Turkish accession. The Syrian 
conflict has, however, accelerated this integration process, although the 2016 coup 
attempt and Turkish demands for visa liberalisation have caused the process to 
stagnate. The draft law on the new Turkish security agency proposed in 2008 was 
meant to be operationalised by 2012 to absorb the functions peppered across various 
Turkish authorities. By 2015, this draft remained just that.75  
The EU has gained negotiation leverage through political conditionality from the 
readmission agreement and financial aid for detention centres, training and 
equipment. However, the lower the prospect of Turkey’s accession, the less effective 
the EU’s conditionality. Moreover, the EU may be gravely overestimating its budgetary 
powers in Turkish border management. Due to its role as a transit and host country, 
Turkey is an indispensable buffer state, meaning the EU itself is being conditioned to 
accept certain terms.76 
EU-Turkey relations have suffered due to the deal’s inability to live up to expectations. 
Turkey’s democratic decline and the EU’s failure to fulfil its promises have led to 
growing resentment on both sides. Turkey has not yet lifted geographic limitations on 
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees although this is an accession condition, 
meaning the Refugee Convention applies only to asylum-seekers originating from 
Europe. Turkey will not fully implement the EU readmission agreement until visa 
liberalisation for Turkish citizens to the Schengen zone is brought to the table. 
Integration between the EU and Turkey has therefore remained incomplete and has 
at times regressed, although efforts are being made to improve relations.  
It must be said that there are indeed efforts to harmonise Turkish border controls with 
EU standards. Common regional border security policies are developing, along with 
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new organisations. However, it must be taken into account that the EU is not the only 
actor present here. The International Organisation for Migration in Turkey is 
implementing two border management projects jointly amounting to €8.5 million, co-
funded by the EU and the Turkish government. The purpose of the first project, 
“Supporting Turkey’s Efforts to Manage Migration” is to reinforce the migration 
management capacity of Turkish authorities, strengthen government institutions and 
encourage regional governments to collaborate on understanding migratory 
patterns. The “Regional Cooperation on Border Management with Greece and 
Bulgaria – Phase 2” project is meant to enhance the development of effective and 
integrated systems in border management between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey in 
line with EU standards.77 Not only is this yet another point in favour of the ‘Coherence’ 
indicator, but it also illustrates that the EU’s actorness expands to other international 
organisations to achieve external outcomes. Moreover, Turkey’s willingness to 
cooperate has proven to be a key factor in the success or failure of EU initiatives. 
Although Turkish institutions are being transformed according to EU accession 
requirements, Turkey’s uncertain future has placed it in limbo and its border 
management bodies are neither inside nor entirely outside the EU framework.78 
Despite Turkish resistance regarding visa liberalisation and the temporary stagnation 
of negotiations during the coup attempt, convergence with EU standards persists and 
efforts are being made to centralise Turkish border management. Therefore, external 
outcomes in Turkey are moderate to strong. Table 3 summarises the findings for the 
Turkish case study. 
Table 3: Level of Institutionalisation of Externalised IBM in Turkey 
Institutional Coordination/Coherence (Carrapico & Barrinha, 2017) 
Vertical  
= strong 
Horizontal 
= strong 
New Capacities/Competences (Baird, 2015) 
= moderate 
External Outcomes (Baird, 2015) 
= moderate-strong 
Overall Assessment: moderate-strong 
Source: compiled by the author. 
  
                                                          
77 International Organisation for Migration, IOM, EU, Turkey Cooperate on EUR 8.5 Million 
Migration and Border Management Projects, Press Release, 6 February 2017. 
78 Baird, op. cit., pp. 856-857. 
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Conclusions 
This paper started by posing the following research question: What has been the effect 
of the 2011 Arab Spring and the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ on the institutionalisation of EU 
border management? In other words, to what extent have these two events served 
as external catalysts for EU integration in this field? The analysis focused mainly on the 
externalisation of IBM rather than looking exclusively at the internal aspect of border 
management policy. To answer the research question, an analytical framework was 
developed to assess the level of institutionalisation that has been achieved in the EU’s 
externalisation of border management using two case studies: Libya and Turkey. 
Making Sense of the Findings 
Overall, it was concluded that there has been a weak level of institutionalisation when 
externalising IBM to Libya, as opposed to moderate-to-strong institutionalisation in the 
case of Turkey. As previously established, these two case studies were chosen for the 
stark contrast between Libya and Turkey which was expected to produce different 
outcomes. Although Libya is in the ENP, it does not have an association agreement 
with the EU and so remains outside most ENP structures. Turkey, on the other hand, is 
not an ENP partner, but it is in the Union for the Mediterranean and a candidate 
country that benefits from the EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). 
Notwithstanding these funds, Turkey has only managed to close one Chapter of the 
EU acquis out of the 33 Chapters that must be negotiated throughout the accession 
process, meaning obstacles to externalisation of border management remain in 
place. Unlike Libya, however, Turkey possesses the administrative infrastructure 
needed, therefore making it only a question of policy harmonisation.  
Despite varying results, both cases confirm that developments in third countries trigger 
EU integration, which transfers powers to the supranational level, thereby increasing 
EU actorness. The interplay between necessary cooperation and reluctance to cede 
national sovereignty is ever-present. On the one hand, the rise of populism favours less 
institutionalisation and seeks to roll back integration. On the other hand, the 
institutionalisation of external capacities may result from the Commission’s efforts to 
expand its competence or from the willingness of member states to band together to 
tackle transboundary crises.  
Figure 1 below demonstrates a simple linear model explaining how an external 
triggering event can kick-start EU integration in a given field (in this case, border 
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management). This integration allows IBM to become further institutionalised, thereby 
providing the EU with more competences to act externally in this policy area and 
influence the third countries concerned. But as previously mentioned, it is worth noting 
that the process may actually be more of a cycle than a clear linear process. Since 
the final phase changes the circumstances in the affected third countries, this can 
again influence the EU integration process from the outside since the EU must again 
adapt to the changed surroundings. It is possible, for instance, that if EU-funded 
training and capacity-building helps neighbouring countries to efficiently manage 
migration while fully respecting the human rights of migrants and asylum-seekers, the 
political incentive to increase FRONTEX’s mandate may weaken.  
 
Figure 1: The Institutionalisation and Externalisation Process in IBM 
 
Source: compiled by the author. 
These findings can be generalised to other countries for contrast. Morocco, for 
instance, participates in the German-Moroccan Partnership on Asylum and 
International Refugee Protection commissioned by the German Federal Foreign Office 
(GIZ). The Morocco-GIZ Partnership assists the Moroccan Ministry of Expatriates and 
Migration Affairs in the implementation of Morocco’s new National Strategy on 
Migration and Asylum which was adopted in 2014. A quick overview suggests 
moderate to strong EU coherence since Germany’s initiative is another example of 
individual member states acting on behalf of EU interests and collaborating with 
European bodies. External outcomes may also be classed as moderate to strong since 
clear results have been achieved with the implementation of new domestic policies 
in Morocco and signs of ongoing progress. However, it remains to be seen whether the 
EU has gained more competences in this area, since the partnership is for all intents 
and purposes a German initiative. It would be interesting for future studies to compare 
these cases with the Western Balkan countries, some of which have shown faster 
progress under funding from the IPA.   
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The hybrid framework used in this study (Table 1) may be replicated in other 
externalised policy areas to analyse their level of institutionalisation. For instance, future 
studies can be carried out on asylum policy, particularly in light of ongoing CEAS 
reform and the future EU Agency for Asylum, in light of which a new external action 
strategy for the Agency is to be developed. This would transform EASO into a fully-
fledged Union agency with a wider mandate that will enable it to post Liaison Officers 
and conclude Working Agreements with third countries.79 While this study is not meant 
as an endorsement of securitisation, the institutionalisation framework developed here 
provides fresh insight into the influence of outside events and entities on the inner 
functioning of the EU. It also has a strong potential to be applied to a variety of non-
migration related areas such as trade, energy, environment or development aid. 
The Future of IBM: What Way Forward? 
Overall, institutionalisation has been achieved to a moderate extent since the two 
crises. Based on these observations, a number of conclusions or proposals may be 
extracted, accompanied by concrete examples, to illustrate the following points: 
First, in order to encourage cooperation and a proportionate distribution of refugees, 
coordination between member states must be ensured. This is to be achieved through 
the still ongoing CEAS reform. However, coherence between the internal and external 
aspects of migration must also be strengthened, namely through cooperation 
between FRONTEX operations and CSDP missions. Due to the mixed nature of JHA 
competences on the one hand and the intergovernmental procedures in CFSP/CSDP 
on the other, it is highly unlikely that a joint institution can be established. Further focus 
should therefore be placed on arrangements like the Justice and Home Affairs-
External Relations (JAI-RELEX) or JAIEX Working Party and the High-Level Working Group 
on Migration. EU agencies will also benefit from cooperating with private entities 
through Private Sponsorship Programmes (PSP). Upon invitation of the European 
Commission, a pilot project on PSP has been undertaken by EASO to coordinate 
between interested member states, while engaging various relevant organisations. 
Second, migration-related EU agencies must be strengthened and new institutions 
established. FRONTEX should continue focusing on obtaining its own resources to avoid 
depending entirely on member state contributions. However, resistance from national 
                                                          
79 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament ad of the 
Council on the European Union Agency for Asylum and Repealing Regulation (EU) No 
439/2010’, COM(2016) 271 final, Brussels, 4 May 2016. 
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armed forces makes drastic changes beyond current coordinative functions highly 
unlikely. Following the MV Lifeline saga, an urgent European Council summit called for 
an increase in centres on EU territory and the establishment of reception centres in 
third countries to prevent migrants from taking to the sea.80 This resolution for reception 
centres suggests a trend towards institutionalisation; however, it raises serious human 
rights concerns and member states have shown no interest in hosting controlled 
centres. A ten-page confidential report from the European Parliament’s Legal Service 
has been leaked by the EUObserver and is reported to state that disembarkation 
platforms “could lawfully be established outside of the European Union, in order to 
receive migrants rescued outside the territory of the Union’s member states”.81 
Although the European Commission tasked EASO with assessing the safety of Morocco 
and Tunisia, neither country has shown an interest in the plan for disembarkation 
platforms and African countries view the proposal as Europe’s attempt to outsource 
responsibility back to Africa. Nevertheless, the EEAS maintains that negotiations 
regarding disembarkation are proceeding in the Council.82 This is an instance which 
somewhat contradicts the original hypothesis of this paper, as we are witnessing EU 
leaders attempting to plough through with an initiative regardless of the lack of third 
country support. It does, however, confirm that external events and common 
problems provide a powerful incentive for negotiations to continue in the Council. 
Third, more resources must be invested in reforms in third-country institutions. This can 
be clearly seen in Morocco’s involvement in the GIZ project and the development of 
Directorate-General of Migration Management in the Turkish Ministry of Interior which 
is mandated to register individuals for temporary protection through its Provincial 
Directorates for Migration Management. Pressure must be placed on Turkey to adhere 
to international law, namely regarding the Geneva Refugee Convention. In return, 
faster EU decision-making procedures must be developed. Turkish frustrations over 
delays in implementing the 18 March 2016 Statement risk Turkey’s continued loss of 
interest in EU accession, and hence lack of incentives for further reform. Turkey plays 
an indispensable role in migration management and may doubt whether accession is 
realistic, given that it is not in the EU’s interest to acquire a direct border with Syria. 
Such uncertainties must be clarified. In Libya’s case, the EU must ensure a smooth 
                                                          
80 D.M. Herszenhorn, J. Barigazzi & M. De La Baume, ‘EU Leaders Clinch Migration Deal in 
Marathon Summit’, Politico, 29 June 2018.  
81 N. Nielsen, ‘EP Lawyers Back EU Plans for Migrant Centres in Africa’, EU Observer, 27 
November 2018,  
82 Ibid. 
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democratic transition during its first general elections since the revolts. International 
support such as election observation missions may facilitate the process.  
Fourth, events such as Brexit show that it would be wrong to assume that IBM is headed 
towards a more federalised system; however, integration shows overall signs of 
increasing. The EU has displayed an ability to adapt to specific crises, even if decision-
making institutions are not capable of responding immediately. However, the exact 
same crisis will never happen in the exact same way again, meaning that further 
reforms may be required in the future. Nevertheless, substantial developments have 
occurred as a response to extra-EU immigration. Both case studies illustrate that actors 
are constantly being influenced by one another and are continuously changing in an 
increasingly globalised world. 
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